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SHEDDING LIGHT ON
THE FEDERAL COURTS’ TREATMENT
OF HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS
UNDER SECTION 1 OF
THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT
Allen G. Haroutounian*
The federal judiciary’s application of Section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act to horizontal restraints remains one of the least defined
areas of antitrust jurisprudence. Part of this problem stems from the
Supreme Court’s failure to articulate clear guidelines since shifting
from the widely used per se standard to the more comprehensive rule of
reason and quick look approaches. Additionally, because the rule of
reason analysis—the predominant standard used by federal courts
today—places great emphasis on a defendant’s market power, the costs
and burdens make it difficult for the plaintiffs to prove Section 1
violations.
This Article surveys recent lower federal court decisions to see how
courts today analyze Section 1 claims, demonstrating that while
considerable confusion still exists in the application of the per se, rule
of reason, and quick look approaches to horizontal restraints, a small
number of federal courts are beginning to apply these approaches with
greater clarity. This Article also argues that the quick look approach
should be abandoned because the per se approach and the rule of
reason already provide sufficient means for analyzing horizontal
restraints. Finally, this Article offers suggestions that shift the rule of
reason analysis away from relying heavily on a defendant’s market
power to determine whether a horizontal restraint violates Section 1.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal courts’ application of Section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act to horizontal restraints is not clear,1 causing some to
consider it as “one of the darkest corners of antitrust law.”2 Much of
this lack of clarity arose when the Supreme Court stopped
determining the legality of some horizontal restraints under the per se
approach—which applies to an agreement or conduct that appears on
its face to be plainly anticompetitive—and began engaging in a more
nuanced analysis under the rule of reason—which balances the net
procompetitive efficiencies and anticompetitive effects of a
defendant’s agreement or conduct.3
This move away from the per se approach was driven by the fact
that many horizontal restraints produced procompetitive efficiencies4
or were necessary to make a product available.5 However, this shift
has produced uncertainty among the federal courts because there is
no single, unified standard for the courts to apply.6 Over the last
twenty years, federal courts have even utilized a third method of
analysis known as the “quick look approach,” which “applies in
1. The federal courts apply Section 1 to determine the legality of horizontal restraints.
David C. Gustman & Jill C. Anderson, Joint Ventures and Other Competitor Collaborations, in
46TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW INSTITUTE 197, 207 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course
Handbook Ser. No. 1484, 2005). A horizontal restraint is an agreement that restrains trade
between two companies that compete with one another. Michael J. Denger et al., Vertical Price,
Customer, and Territorial Restrictions, in 48TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST LAW INSTITUTE 295, 305
(PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 1602, 2007). Horizontal restraints can
range from price-fixing agreements to joint ventures. Id. For an in-depth analysis of Section 1 and
horizontal restraints, see infra Part II.
2. In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1007 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting
Joseph F. Brodley, The Legal Status of Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Laws: A Summary
Assessment, 21 ANTITRUST BULL. 453, 453 (1976)); Thomas A. Piraino Jr., Beyond Per Se, Rule
of Reason or Merger Analysis: A New Standard for Joint Ventures, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1, 12
(1991).
3. Piraino, supra note 2, at 14–15.
4. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard for
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1753, 1754 (1994).
5. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984). A horizontal
restraint does not always have to produce a new product in order to trigger the application of the
rule of reason. For example, the Supreme Court in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific
Stationary & Printing Co. applied the rule of reason to a cooperative arrangement among a group
of retailers aimed at reducing prices. 472 U.S. 284, 297 (1985). Similarly, in In re ATM Fee
Antitrust Litigation, a district court in the Northern District of California applied the rule of
reason to an agreement that eliminated the interchange fees of an ATM network. 554 F. Supp. 2d
at 1016.
6. Piraino, supra note 2, at 2.
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cases where per se condemnation is inappropriate but where no
elaborate industry analysis [under the rule of reason] is required to
demonstrate the anticompetitive character of an inherently suspect
restraint.”7
The courts’ inability to develop a unified standard for analyzing
competitor collaborations is found not only in the application of the
per se approach, the rule of reason, or the quick look approach but
also in the application of the ancillary restraints doctrine. Under the
ancillary restraints doctrine, the challenged agreement “must be
subordinate and collateral to a separate, legitimate transaction.”8 This
Article will point out, however, that there are varying interpretations
of the ancillary restraints doctrine, which creates confusion in its
application. To add more fuel to the fire, federal courts also employ
different standards in determining how related a horizontal restraint
must be to a defendants’ agreement or conduct under the ancillary
restraints doctrine. For example, in order for a restraint to be
ancillary, some courts hold that the restraint must be “essential” to
the defendants’ agreement or conduct,9 while other courts hold that
the restraint must be “reasonably” or “plausibly related” to the
defendants’ agreement or conduct.10 This lack of unity makes it
difficult for defendants to predict which level of scrutiny will apply
in their cases.
Another reason why the courts have been unable to articulate a
consistent standard for analyzing horizontal restraints arises from the
fact that competitors are collaborating in increasingly new and
creative ways.11 For example, with regard to some joint ventures,12
American firms have realized that the procompetitive efficiencies
that result from entering into a joint venture may outweigh the

7. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 830 (3d Cir. 2010). The quick
look approach has its origins in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma and
FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986). See infra Part II.D.3.
8. Gustman & Anderson, supra note 1, at 213 (quoting Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas
Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
9. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures After the Supreme
Court’s Dagher Decision, 57 EMORY L.J. 735, 746 (2008).
10. Id.
11. Piraino, supra note 2, at 2.
12. A joint venture is defined as “two or more firms agree[ing] to cooperate in producing
some input that they would otherwise have produced individually, acquired on the market, or
perhaps done without.” Gustman & Anderson, supra note 1, at 203.
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anticompetitive conduct, if any, that the joint venture produces.13
Thus, such firms are motivated to create collaborations that can
result in innovative technologies, efficient production and
manufacturing, and entry into new markets.14 Unfortunately, the
inconsistency created by the federal courts has made it difficult for
American businesses to know whether their joint venture will be
upheld as valid under Section 1.15
This Article analyzes how the federal courts decide which
approach to apply in analyzing horizontal restraints. Specifically, this
Article surveys how recent lower federal courts have interpreted the
Supreme Court’s horizontal-restraint jurisprudence and describes the
methods of analyses they employ in these cases. This Article also
advocates three changes in the judiciary’s treatment of horizontal
restraints by calling on the federal courts to do the following: (1)
abandon the quick look approach because the rule of reason and per
se approach already provide sufficient means for analyzing Section 1
violations; (2) decide whether to apply the rule of reason or quick
look approach by either analyzing the defendants’ procompetitive
justifications for the restraint or using the ancillary restraints
doctrine, which applies a “reasonably necessary” standard to
determine how related a restraint must be to the horizontal
agreement; and (3) employ a set of factors under the rule of reason,
which will force the courts to move away from placing a heavy
emphasis on a defendant’s market power in a relevant market.
Part II of this Article offers an overview of horizontal
agreements. Part II.A identifies Section 1 as the legal standard that
governs horizontal restraints and describes what kinds of action
trigger Section 1 scrutiny. Part II.B defines different types of
horizontal agreements, focusing on joint ventures and the benefits
and consequences resulting from such organizations in the
marketplace. Part II.C summarizes the history of the federal
judiciary’s treatment of horizontal agreement; Part II.D discusses the
three types of analyses that courts use in analyzing Section 1

13. See Piraino, supra note 2, at 2.
14. See id. at 2–3.
15. See id. at 5.

1178

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1173

violations: the per se approach, the rule of reason, and the quick look
approach.16
Next, Part III analyzes how the lower federal courts have drawn
distinctions among these approaches and limited their application to
different types of conduct. Part IV highlights crucial problems in the
federal courts’ application of the three types of approaches, paying
careful attention to how the courts unnecessarily emphasize market
share analysis under the rule of reason. Part IV also argues that
although considerable confusion is apparent in the lower courts’
application of the per se approach, the rule of reason, and the quick
look approach, a small number of recent lower court decisions signal
the possibility that these courts are finally distinguishing between the
three approaches with greater confidence. Finally, Part V proposes
that courts abandon the quick look approach, apply a more refined
ancillary restraints doctrine, and adopt certain factors to better apply
the rule of reason. Part VI concludes by reminding the federal courts
that, in an attempt to solve these problems, the courts should strive
for simplicity.
II. BACKGROUND
This part first describes the threshold requirements that a
plaintiff must meet in order to trigger Section 1 liability. Next, this
part discusses the three approaches that lower federal courts use to
analyze Section 1 claims: the per se approach, the rule of reason, and
the quick look approach. Finally, this section summarizes the
development of these three approaches in the federal courts.
A. The Legal Standard:
The Sherman Antitrust Act
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act “applies only to
concerted action that restrains trade.”17 Under Section 1, “[e]very
16. Justice Souter in California Dental Ass’n v. FTC suggested the possibility of another
approach, one that lies between the quick look approach and the rule of reason. See infra note
206.
17. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2208 (2010). The Sherman Act distinguishes
concerted action from independent action. Id. Concerted action occurs when “two or more entities
that previously pursued their own interests separately [combine] to act as one for their common
benefit” in restraining trade. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769
(1984). Concerted action carries with it a high degree of anticompetitive risk because it “deprives
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contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States” is deemed illegal.18 Literally read, Section 1 can apply to
every possible type of agreement, ranging from “a group of
competing firms fixing prices [to] a single firm’s chief executive
telling her subordinate how to price their company’s product.”19
However, courts have not interpreted Section 1 literally.20 Instead,
the Supreme Court has long recognized Congress’s intent that
Section 1 should only apply to concerted action that unreasonably
restrains trade.21
To successfully plead a Section 1 violation, a plaintiff must
show that two or more independent competitors, pursuing their own,
separate economic goals, came together through an agreement or
conduct, which subsequently resulted in anticompetitive effects, such
as a “loss of actual or potential competition,” a “decrease in diversity
of entrepreneurial interests,” or a “reduction of independent centers
of decision making.”22 If the agreement produces such
anticompetitive effects, then a defendant has likely violated Section
1.23

the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking [sic] that competition assumes and
demands.” Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2209. It does not matter whether the alleged conspirators are
a single entity or have a single name, or whether the parties seem like one firm or multiple firms.
Id. at 2211–12. Instead, the court focuses on how the parties involved in the alleged
anticompetitive conduct actually operate. Id. at 2209.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). The Sherman Act was adopted as Congress began to realize that
more and more businesses were joining together in order to increase their market share and
squeeze out competition. 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade
Practices § 46 (2009). The purpose behind the act was to replace the common law rules that
addressed horizontal restraints with a uniform standard that “condemned such restraints whenever
they occur[ed] in or affect[ed] interstate commerce.” Id. The common law at the time the
Sherman Act was adopted made contracts, combinations, and agreements in restraint of trade
illegal and unenforceable if they “restricted or suppressed competition in the market, fixed prices,
divided marketing territories, apportioned customers, restricted production, [or] . . . raised prices.”
Id.
19. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2208.
20. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687–88 (1978).
21. Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3,
10 (1997) (stating that the Supreme Court “has long recognized that Congress intended to outlaw
only unreasonable restraints”).
22. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2212.
23. Id. at 2212.
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B. Horizontal Restraints of
Trade and Commerce
Horizontal and vertical restraints24 can be classified as concerted
action under Section 1.25 A horizontal restraint is an agreement
between companies that directly compete with one another at the
same production or distribution level.26 Horizontal restraints are
either naked or ancillary and can range in form from plain vanilla
pricing-fixing agreements to highly integrated joint ventures where
two companies collaborate to offer a product or service in an
economically efficient manner.27 An ancillary restraint is a restraint
that is created in addition to or after the initial collaboration between
the competitors that allows them to reach the objectives of their
initial agreement more effectively.28 For example, a joint venture is a
collaborative activity that exists when “two or more firms agree to
cooperate in producing some input that they would otherwise have
produced individually, acquired on the market, or perhaps done
without.”29 Thus, an ancillary restraint is created either before or
24. A vertical restraint is an “agreement between firms at different levels of distribution.”
Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93
IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1219 (2008); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
551 U.S. 877, 889–93 (2007) (discussing the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of
vertical price restraints). Vertical agreements are beyond the scope of this Article.
25. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 24, at 1212, 1219–20, 1223, 1243.
26. Denger et al., supra note 1, at 305.
27. William J. Kolasky, Antitrust Treatment of Joint Ventures, in 50TH ANNUAL ANTITRUST
LAW INSTITUTE 129, 131 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 1738, 2009).
28. Claire E. Trunzo, Ancillary Restraints in a Competitive Global Economy: Does the
Possibility Exist for an Ancillary Restriction to Be Reasonable in Light of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act?, 29 DUQ. L. REV. 291, 292–93 (1991). Section 188 of The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts states that an ancillary restraint is unreasonable if the “restraint is greater than is needed
to protect the promisee’s legitimate interest, or . . . the promisee’s need is outweighed by the
hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 188 (2010). Such examples include “a promise by the seller of a business not to
compete with the buyer in such a way as to injure the value of the business sold [and] . . . a
promise by a partner not to compete with the partnership.” Id.
29. Gustman & Anderson, supra note 1, at 203. The most common types of joint ventures
include research and development, production/manufacturing, marketing, and network joint
ventures. Mary L. Azcuenaga et al., Overview of the Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures, in 48TH
ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTITRUST SEMINAR: DISTRIBUTION & MARKETING 175, 180–83 (PLI
Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 1714, 2009). In a research and development
joint venture, partners combine their research and development departments to develop new
products more efficiently. Id. at 180. In a production/manufacturing joint venture, firms
“collaborate to manufacture products, either to sell to consumers or for use by the parties
themselves as an input in their own production process.” Id. In a marketing joint venture, parties
“reduce costs, bring products to market more quickly, sell new products . . . or sell to new
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after the parties form a joint venture, and it produces greater
productivity or output that benefits the joint venture.30 Conversely, a
naked restraint is an agreement that serves no purpose other than to
eliminate competition.31 Such restraints include those that fix prices
or reduce output. Courts declare naked restraints per se illegal and
analyze ancillary restraints under the rule of reason.32
Once a court determines that the defendant’s conduct is
concerted action that triggers Section 1, it must then determine which
method of analysis to use: per se or rule of reason.
Conduct that falls under the per se approach is deemed illegal on
its face, without any regard to surrounding circumstances.33
Alternatively, conduct analyzed under the rule of reason is subject to
customers that they otherwise would have been unable to reach on their own.” Id. at 181. In a
network joint venture, parties collaborate “to create a system, or ‘network,’ that consumers can
use to access a variety of things, including information and services.” Id. at 182. Research and
development, production/manufacturing, and network joint ventures are generally viewed
favorably by the courts because they produce competitive efficiencies with little anticompetitive
effects. Id. at 180–83. On the other hand, marketing joint ventures are subject to more scrutiny
because of the possibility that the collaborators can coordinate pricing and output decisions or
allocate territories. See id. at 181–82.
Since the mid-1970s, joint ventures have become increasingly popular. Howard H.
Chang et al., Some Economic Principles for Guiding Antitrust Policy Towards Joint Ventures,
1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223 (1998). For example, in the information technology industry, two
hundred joint ventures formed from 1970 to 1990. Id. at 228–29. Additionally, joint ventures
between U.S. and foreign firms increased by as much as 27 percent per year between 1985 and
1992. Id. at 229.
30. Consider a hypothetical example:
Compu-Max and Compu-Pro are two major producers of a variety of computer
software. Each has a large, world-wide sales department. Each firm has developed and
sold its own word-processing software. However, despite all efforts to develop a strong
market presence in word processing, each firm has achieved only slightly more than a
10% market share, and neither is a major competitor to the two firms that dominate the
word-processing software market. Compu-Max and Compu-Pro determine that in light
of their complementary areas of design expertise they could develop a markedly better
word-processing program together than either can produce on its own. Compu-Max
and Compu-Pro form a joint venture, WORD-FIRM, to jointly develop and market a
new word-processing program, with expenses and profits to be split equally. CompuMax and Compu-Pro both contribute to WORD-FIRM software developers
experienced with word processing.
FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS
AMONG COMPETITORS app. § 3.2 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/
ftcdojguidelines.pdf.
31. Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188–89 (7th Cir. 1985).
32. Trunzo, supra note 28, at 294–97.
33. E-mail from Daniel E. Lazaroff, Professor of Law and Leonard Cohen Chair in Law and
Econs. and Dir., Loyola Sports Law Inst., Loyola Law Sch. of L.A. (Mar. 2, 2012, 08:59 PST)
[hereinafter Mar. 2 E-mail from Daniel E. Lazaroff] (on file with author).
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an inquiry based on a number of factors, most notably analysis of
market power, to determine whether the particular restraint violates
Section 1.34 In the last fifteen years, the courts have sparingly used a
third method of analysis, known as the quick look approach, when it
would be inappropriate to apply the per say approach but
unnecessary to conduct an elaborate analysis of the relevant market
under the rule of reason.35
In deciding which method of analysis to apply, a court must
ultimately consider whether the alleged conduct or agreement
produces sound procompetitive efficiencies that outweigh its
anticompetitive effects—i.e., the net procompetitive effects,36 To
answer this question, courts either use the ancillary restraints
doctrine or look to the defendant’s procompetitive justifications to
determine whether the defendant’s conduct is more than just a naked
price restraint or restriction on output.37 If under either approach the
court determines that the defendant’s conduct or agreement is a
naked restraint, it applies the per se approach.38 If, however, there
appears to be potential for overall procompetitive effects, the court
applies either the rule of reason or the quick look approach.39
1. Ancillary Restraints Doctrine
William Howard Taft, then a judge on the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, introduced the ancillary restraints doctrine into American
common law in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.40 Since
34. Piraino, supra note 4, at 1753–54.
35. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 830 (3d Cir. 2010).
36. Mar. 2 E-mail from Daniel E. Lazaroff, supra note 33.
37. Id.
38. See infra Part II.D.1.
39. E-mail from Daniel E. Lazaroff, Professor of Law and Leonard Cohen Chair in Law and
Econs. and Dir., Loyola Sports Law Inst., Loyola Law Sch. of L.A. (Feb. 24, 2012, 14:12 PST)
(on file with author).
40. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898); see also Gregory J. Werden, The Ancillary Restraints
Doctrine, in RULE OF REASON V. PER SE: WHERE ARE THE BOUNDARIES NOW? 1, 1 (Am. Bar
Assoc. Section of Antitrust Law ed., 2006), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/atcommittees/at-s1/pdf/spring-materials/2006/werden06.pdf (stating that Judge Taft imposed the
ancillary restraint doctrine into the Sherman Act jurisprudence in his Addyston Pipe opinion). In
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., Judge Taft wrote that
no conventional restraint of trade can be enforced unless the covenant embodying it is
merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary to protect the
covenantee in the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him
from the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by the other party.
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then, there have been varying interpretations of the doctrine.41
Regardless of which interpretation of the ancillary restraint doctrine
a court uses, it initially determines whether there may be plausible or
credible procompetitive justifications that result from the defendant’s
restraint.42 If a restraint is ancillary, the defendant’s restraint may
have procompetitive efficiencies.43
Under the first definition, a restraint is ancillary or nonancillary
depending on whether it carries the “potential to facilitate the
accomplishment of a joint venture’s legitimate objectives.”44 If the
defendant’s agreement “promoted enterprise and productivity at the
time it was adopted,” the court must apply the rule of reason to
analyze this agreement with greater scrutiny.45 Thus, whether the
restraint is ancillary is clearly distinct from whether it is reasonable
because the court only decides if the defendant’s restraint creates
some plausible basis for procompetitive efficiencies that would then
allow it to analyze the restraint under the rule of reason.46
A second definition of the ancillary restraints doctrine conflates
the issue of whether the restraint is ancillary with the question of
whether it is reasonable.47 Under this interpretation, an ancillary
restraint is lawful so long as it is “reasonably ‘related to the
efficiency sought’” by the defendants’ initial agreement.48 Since a

85 F. at 282. In Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, the Court stated in dicta about the ancillary restraints
doctrine:
[It] governs the validity of restrictions imposed by a legitimate business collaboration,
such as a business association or joint venture, or nonventure activities. Under the
doctrine, courts must determine whether the nonventure restriction is a naked restraint
on trade, and thus invalid, or one that is ancillary to the legitimate and competitive
purposes of the business association, and thus valid.
547 U.S. 1, 7 (2006) (citations omitted).
41. See generally Werden, supra note 40 (discussing various approaches to the ancillary
restraint doctrine).
42. E-mail from Daniel E. Lazaroff, Professor of Law and Leonard Cohen Chair in Law and
Econs. and Dir., Loyola Sports Law Inst., Loyola Law Sch. of L.A. (Mar. 2, 2012, 14:45 PST)
(on file with author).
43. Id.
44. Werden, supra note 40, at 4.
45. Id. (quoting Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1985)).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. James H. “Hart” Holden, Joint Ventures and the Supreme Court’s Decision in Texaco,
Inc. v. Dagher: A Win for Substance over Form, 62 BUS. LAW. 1467, 1476–77 (2007).
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court considers ancillary restraints reasonable under this definition,
all ancillary restraints are lawful.49
Finally, under a third definition, a restraint is ancillary “if [it is]
reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of a [joint] venture’s
efficiency-enhancing purposes.”50 Under this approach, an ancillary
restraint is analyzed along with the formation of the joint venture,
while a nonancillary restraint is analyzed separately from the joint
venture.51 For example, if a restraint produces a “loss of independent
decision making” among competitors in the market but is
“reasonably necessary” to make the joint venture more efficient, the
restraint is ancillary.52 On the other hand, if a restraint is
nonancillary, the court analyzes only the restraint, with no
consideration of the joint venture.53 Under this definition, a court
may condemn a nonancillary restraint in a joint venture as per se
illegal despite the potential procompetitive efficiencies that may
result from that joint venture.54 Alternatively, if the joint venture is
legitimate, a court analyzes the joint venture and its ancillary
restraint together under the rule of reason.55 Thus, unlike the second
definition of the ancillary restraints doctrine, this definition does not
conflate the issue of whether the restraint is ancillary with the
question of whether the restraint is reasonable. This is because
49. Werden, supra note 40, at 4.
50. Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust Analysis of Joint Ventures: An Overview, 66 ANTITRUST
L.J. 701, 734 (1998). Such a restraint “may be reasonably necessary to the achievement of the
efficiency-enhancing purposes . . . in a variety of ways.” Id. at 707. For example, a
restraint may make the venture itself operate more efficiently[,] . . . prevent a [member
of the] joint venture from appropriating an undue share of the venture’s benefits[,] . . .
prevent nonparticipants from appropriating joint venture benefits for which they have
not shared costs[,] . . . [or] prevent unintended . . . consequences that might make the
joint venture uneconomic.
Id.
51. Werden, supra note 40, at 4.
52. For example, in Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., then-Judge
Sotomayor concluded in her concurrence that the exclusivity and profit-sharing provisions in
Major League Baseball Properties’ (MLBP) agreement were “reasonably necessary to achieve
MLBP’s efficiency-enhancing purposes because [the provision] eliminate[d] . . . potential
externalities” that would “limit the potential efficiency gains of [the] MLBP.” 542 F.3d 290, 340
(2d Cir. 2008) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). After making this determination, Sotomayor
concluded that MLBP’s restraint should be analyzed together with the defendants’ joint venture
under the rule of reason. Id.
53. Werden, supra note 50, at 734.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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initially, a court is only concerned with whether the defendant’s
restraint produces potential procompetitive efficiencies that warrant
further analysis under the rule of reason.
2. Procompetitive Justifications
If a federal court does not use the ancillary restraints doctrine to
determine whether to apply the per se approach, it looks to the
procompetitive justifications offered by the defendant to reach this
decision.56 Again, when determining whether to apply the rule of
reason, the court makes a preliminary determination to see whether
there may be plausible or credible procompetitive justifications for
the defendants’ restraint.57 If the court believes that the defendants’
restraint may create potential benefits, this is enough to trigger the
rule of reason.58
This analysis is separate from the one the court conducts under
the rule of reason, where the court considers the procompetitive
justifications that the defendants offer to rebut the claim that their
conduct or agreement violates Section 1.59 Here, the court’s analysis
of the defendants’ procompetitive justifications parallels its analysis
under the ancillary restraints doctrine, where it determines whether
the defendants’ restraint is naked or ancillary. For example, in a joint
venture, the parties integrate their resources while simultaneously
competing with one another in the areas not covered by the joint
venture.60 This generates competitive efficiencies, such as reduced
cost, higher output, and better quality, which in turn produce many
advantages, including the addition of a new competitor to the market,
the facilitation of “market entry primarily through risk-sharing and
the fusion of complementary resources,” and the ability to “penetrate
new markets which its partners [individually] could not have

56. E.g., California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d. 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011) (en
banc); Salvino, 542 F.3d at 307–08.
57. Mar. 2 E-mail from Daniel E. Lazaroff, supra note 33.
58. Id.; see, e.g., Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 212,
219 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (concluding that the rule of reason, not the per se approach, should apply
simply because “MLBP’s role in licensing [Major League Baseball (MLB)] intellectual property
[was] not a naked restraint on trade”), aff’d, 542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2008).
59. See infra Part II.D.2.
60. Gustman & Anderson, supra note 1, at 204.
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entered . . . .”61 The court will apply the rule of reason where the
defendants’ agreement or conduct produces procompetitive
efficiencies “that could not have been achieved independently.”62
This suggests that the more integrated a joint venture is, the more
likely a court is to apply the rule of reason.
Although the court either uses the ancillary restraints doctrine or
looks to the defendant’s procompetitive justifications to determine
whether to apply the rule of reason or per se approach, it essentially
conducts the same analysis under both methods to answer the
ultimate question of whether the defendant’s conduct or agreement
produces procompetitive efficiencies. In other words, the defendant
succeeds under the rule of reason if the court finds that the
defendant’s restraint is reasonable under the ancillary restraints
doctrine or that the defendant’s procompetitive justifications are
legitimate.
This process of either using the ancillary restraints doctrine or
considering the defendant’s procompetitive justifications is best
illustrated by the majority and concurring opinions in Major League
Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc.63 This case concerned
whether Major League Baseball Properties (MLBP) violated Section
1 by designating itself as the exclusive licensing agent for Major
League Baseball (MLB).64 In upholding the district court’s decision
to apply the rule of reason, the Salvino court did not use the ancillary
restraints doctrine.65 Rather, it focused on Salvino’s arguments that
61. Piraino, supra note 2, at 8–9. The joint venture between Boeing, an aircraft
manufacturer, and several Japanese manufacturers to produce and share the immense cost of
producing a new commercial aircraft illustrates such efficiencies. Id. at 9. The efficiencies that
joint ventures produce, however, are not free of anticompetitive effects. Joseph F. Brodley, Joint
Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1530–32 (1982). A joint venture can
produce anticompetitive effects, including “collusion,” “loss of potential competition,” or “market
exclusion and access discrimination.” Id.
62. Azcuenaga et al., supra note 29, at 184. For example, in Salvino, the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court’s decision to apply the rule of reason to Major League Baseball
Properties’ conduct because Salvino failed to prove that MLBP’s conduct reduced output.
Salvino, 542 F.3d at 306–07, 334. Therefore, per se treatment was inappropriate because MLBP’s
conduct was “not a naked restraint on trade.” Id. at 307. Similarly, quick look treatment was
inappropriate because the “casual observer could not summarily conclude that MLBP’s
arrangement has an anticompetitive effect on customers.” Id.
63. 542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2008).
64. Id. at 293–94.
65. Id. at 334 (holding that the rule of reason, and not the per se or quick look approach,
applied to MLBP’s licensing agreement).
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the MLBP’s conduct amounted to a restriction on output and price
and, therefore, did not produce any procompetitive efficiencies.66 In
rejecting Salvino’s arguments, the Second Circuit pointed to
deficiencies in Salvino’s presentation of evidence.67
In her concurring opinion, then-Judge Sotomayor agreed with
the majority’s holding that analyzing MLBP’s conduct under the rule
of reason was appropriate, but she instead used the ancillary
restraints doctrine to reach that conclusion.68 Judge Sotomayor
argued that the ancillary restraints doctrine was the “superior method
for analyzing the challenged restraint [in the case] because it
effectively isolates when an exclusive arrangement should be viewed
under the rule of reason, as a reasonably necessary part of a joint
venture, and when it should be reviewed as a naked restraint.”69
According to Judge Sotomayor, the exclusivity provision that
made the MLBP the exclusive licensor of MLB’s intellectual
property was “reasonably necessary to achieve MLBP’s efficiencyenhancing purposes because [the provision] eliminate[d] . . .
potential externalities that [would] otherwise distort the incentives of
individual [c]lubs and limit the potential efficiency . . . of MLBP.”70
As a result, Judge Sotomayor believed that MLBP’s “restraints must
be viewed as ancillary to the joint venture and reviewed under the
rule of reason in the context of the joint venture as a whole.”71 Thus,

66. Id. at 318–21.
67. Id. at 318–34. The court held that Salvino could not prove that the agreement between
MLB and the MLBP “limit[ed] output.” Id. at 319. The only evidence that Salvino pointed to
showed that the output had, in fact, increased. Id. at 319. Furthermore, according to the court,
Salvino misunderstood what a price restriction is: what he thought was an agreement to fix prices
was actually a profit sharing agreement. Id. at 320. Finally, the court also pointed out that Salvino
unsuccessfully and incorrectly drew comparisons between this case and Broadcast Music, Inc.
and NCAA. Id. at 320–25.
68. Id. at 341 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
69. Id. This is similar to the third interpretation of the ancillary restraints doctrine discussed
in Part II.B.1.
70. Id. at 340. According to Judge Sotomayor, one of the most notable externalities that the
exclusivity provision would eliminate is the free-rider problem. Id. Free riding in this context
occurs if one baseball club gains an advantage over other clubs from MLB’s licensing of its
products. Id. In fact, Judge Sotomayor pointed out that both Salvino and the MLBP admitted that
the externalities are in place to promote efficiency, and without them, any progress the MLBP
made in gaining efficiencies would be lost. Id.
71. Id. Judge Sotomayor criticized the majority for failing to recognize that this exclusivity
agreement differed from the blanket licensing agreement in Broadcast Music, Inc. and for further
failing to offer analysis as to this distinction. Id. at 341.
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after initially determining that there was a potential for
procompetitive efficiencies, Judge Sotomayor concluded that these
justifications must be analyzed under the rule of reason and
concurred with the majority’s rule of reason analysis.72
In Salvino, the majority opinion—which considered Salvino’s
procompetitive justifications—and the concurring opinion—which
used the ancillary restraints doctrine—both reached the same
conclusion that the rule of reason, not the per se approach, should be
applied to MLBP’s conduct. However, this is not surprising given
that both approaches aim to answer whether the defendant’s alleged
conduct or agreement produces net procompetitive efficiencies.
C. Treatment of Horizontal Agreements
Since the Passage of Section 1
The law of horizontal restraints did not develop overnight. When
Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, it delegated
broad authority to the courts “to develop [the] federal ‘common law’
of antitrust regulation.”73 Since then, the federal courts have been
responsible for developing the rule of law for American businesses.74
During the first thirty years after the Sherman Act’s enactment, the
largest issue that the federal courts faced was the scope of the
Sherman Act’s restrictions and the extent to which these restrictions
affected American businesses such as “steel, oil, and railroad
trusts.”75 One thing that was certain, however, was that the federal
courts had a duty to regulate competition among American firms
under the Sherman Act.76

72. Id. While at first glance it may seem that Judge Sotomayor utilized the second definition
of the ancillary restraints doctrine, which conflates the issue of whether a restraint is ancillary
with whether the restraint is reasonable, she did not. Instead, Judge Sotomayor first determined
that MLBP’s restraint had a potential to produce procompetitive efficiencies and, therefore, was a
reasonable part of the joint venture. Based on this, Judge Sotomayor pointed out that the
application of the rule of reason was appropriate and concurred with the majority’s rule of reason
analysis.
73. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Harvard and Chicago Schools: A New Antitrust
Approach for the 21st Century, 82 IND. L.J. 345, 346 (2007).
74. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Common Law for the Twenty-First Century, 2009
UTAH L. REV. 635, 636 (2009).
75. Id. at 638.
76. Id.
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Following this initial era, the courts transitioned into a period
known as “the Harvard Era.”77 From the 1930s to the 1960s, the
courts turned their attention to ensuring that big businesses did not
harm the American consumers by taking advantage of their large
market power.78 As a result, the courts looked out for small
businesses, scrutinizing “a wide range of competitive conduct” that
potentially harmed these businesses.79 During this time, the per se
approach was the dominant method of analysis used to analyze
horizontal restraints.80
Then, beginning in the 1970s, a new school of thought has
emerged known as “the Chicago Era.”81 Under this ideology, courts
view antitrust laws as a way “to increase the efficiency of the
American economy” rather than adopting the Harvard Era’s view
that small businesses should be protected from big businesses that
abuse their market power.82 As the federal courts began to better
understand economic theory, they started to move away from the per
se approach and toward the rule of reason.83 The courts realized that
the per se approach held certain conduct illegal, even if it provided
legitimate, competitive efficiencies.84
Over the past twenty years, there has been a trend in the federal
court system toward recognizing that, while markets must be
respected, courts must intervene to protect consumers and prevent
harm from conduct that arises from aggressive competition.85
Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) promulgated the Antitrust Guidelines
for Collaborations Among Competitors (the “Collaboration
Guidelines”) in 2000 in order to provide greater “clarity [and
guidance to businesspeople] regarding their treatment under antitrust
laws.”86 The Collaboration Guidelines describe the analytical
framework that the FTC and DOJ use “to assist businesses in
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Piraino, supra note 4, at 1755–56.
Piraino, supra note 74, at 638.
Id. at 638–39.
Piraino, supra note 4, at 1754.
Id. at 1756–57.
Piraino, supra note 74, at 639–40.
FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 1.
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assessing the likelihood of an antitrust challenge to a collaboration
with one or more competitors.”87 The purpose of the Collaboration
Guidelines is to help competitors understand how the agencies
interpret antitrust law so that when these competitors are evaluating a
potential collaboration, they know with greater certainty whether
their collaboration will violate Section 1.88 This, in turn, will
“encourage procompetitive collaborations, [deter] collaborations
likely to harm competition and consumers, and [facilitate] the
Agencies’ investigation of collaborations.”89
Since 2009, the Obama Administration has taken an aggressive
stance toward enforcing antitrust laws, arguing that corporations
should not be allowed to abuse their large market power to “elbow
out [other] competitors or to keep them from gaining market
share.”90 Instead, Christine Varney, the Director of the Antitrust
Division at the DOJ, has clearly stated that it must return to focusing
on the ultimate goal of antitrust law: protecting the consumer.91
D. The Three Methods of Analysis:
Per Se, Rule of Reason, and Quick Look
As discussed in Part II.B, the federal courts apply one of three
different analyses to determine whether a horizontal restraint violates
Section 1: the per se approach, the rule of reason, or the quick look
approach. This section chronicles the history of how the federal
courts have developed and applied each approach.

87. Id. at 2. Some have argued that the Collaboration Guidelines need to be revised because
of key Supreme Court decisions—including Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher and American Needle, Inc. v.
National Football League—that address joint ventures. See Robert A. Skitol, Are the Competitor
Collaboration Guidelines Ripe for Revision?, ANTITRUST, Fall 2010, at 55.
88. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 2.
89. Id. The D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in PolyGram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 32
(D.C. Cir. 2005), demonstrates how the FTC brought a Section 1 challenge against a joint venture
between two record labels, Warner and Polygram. Kolasky, supra note 27, at 145–46. Here,
Polygram and Warner entered into a joint venture to “distribute recordings from the third concert”
of a three-part concert series by the Three Tenors. Id. at 146. Warner and Polygram realized that
the third recording would have been less profitable and therefore “agreed not to advertise or
discount either of the earlier recordings for a ten-week period surrounding the launch of the third
recording.” Id. The district court upheld the FTC’s finding that Polygram and Warner’s
agreement violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Id. at 145.
90. Stephen Labaton, Obama Takes Tougher Antitrust Line, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/business/economy/12antitrust.html?pagewanted=all.
91. Id.
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1. Application of the Per Se Approach
by the Federal Courts
The Sherman Act makes a combination per se illegal if it was
“formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing,
fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in
interstate . . . commerce” per se illegal.92 In other words, an
agreement or conduct that appears “so plainly anticompetitive”
carries a presumption of per se illegality.93 For example, conduct that
“almost always” results in a reduction of competition or output is
anticompetitive on its face and is per se illegal.94 As a result, under
the per se approach, the court need not engage in the “elaborate
industry analysis” required by the rule of reason.95
Under the per se approach—the most direct method for
challenging the reasonableness of a restraint—courts presume the
competitive effect of the challenged conduct or agreement without
any inquiry into the claimed business purpose, anticompetitive harm,
or overall competitive effects.96 In analyzing a joint venture, a court
92. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). The Supreme Court
announced the per se rule for the first time in Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. Travis J. Hill & Stephanie
B. Lezell, Antitrust Violations, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 245, 250 (2010). In this case, the defendant
oil companies were able to charge higher prices for their own products as a result of their having
bought “low-priced distressed gasoline from independent refineries.” Donald L. Beschle, “What,
Never? Well, Hardly Ever”: Strict Antitrust Scrutiny as an Alternative to Per Se Antitrust
Illegality, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 477 (1987). In holding that the defendants’ conduct violated the
Sherman Act, the Court held that “it was irrelevant that the defendants lacked sufficient market
power to actually achieve their goals.” Id.
93. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1979).
94. Id. at 19–20.
95. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986). The rationale behind the per se
approach is that if a restraint is anticompetitive on its face, then courts need not engage in a
“complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry
involved” in order to deem that restraint “unreasonable.” Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y,
457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982) (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). For an
in-depth analysis of the defendant’s market share in a relevant market, see supra Part IV.C.
96. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 24, at 1213–14. In Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. United
States, Justice Blackmun explained the appropriateness and need for per se rules. 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958). Justice Blackmun wrote:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they
have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se
unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are proscribed by the
Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the
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considers the level of integration between the parties when
determining whether to apply the per se approach.97 The more joint
ventures integrate resources, the less likely they will be subject to per
se scrutiny.98 The Collaboration Guidelines employ the same
analysis to evaluate whether the challenged restraint is per se
illegal.99
By the 1960s, the per se approach was widely used by federal
courts at all levels because of its many benefits.100 For example, this
approach easily applied to a wide variety of conduct and agreements,
which conserved the judicial system’s resources by cutting the cost
and length of trials.101 At the same time, the per se approach
functioned as a deterrent to anticompetitive conduct.102 However, as
courts became more versed in economic theory, it became apparent
increasingly apparent that the per se approach was too inflexible.103
The central problem with the per se approach was that it kept
potentially beneficial business from forming because courts applied
it “mechanically” without considering the potential procompetitive
efficiencies generated by many of the challenged collaborations.104
In 1979, the Supreme Court, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS,105
recognized the need to depart from the per se approach and move
toward the rule of reason.106 Since then, the Court has limited the
application of the per se approach while expanding the use of the rule
of reason.107

necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the
entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to
determine at large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable—an inquiry so
often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
Id.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Azcuenaga et al., supra note 29, at 184.
Id.
FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 8.
Piraino, supra note 4, at 1755–56.
Id. at 1756.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1756–57.
441 U.S. 1 (1979).
Piraino, supra note 4, at 1758.
Id. at 1753–54.
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2. Application of the Rule of Reason
Approach by the Federal Courts
In 1918, the Supreme Court formally defined the rule of reason
in Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States.108 Since then,
the Court has maintained that under the rule of reason, the central
inquiry is “whether the challenged agreement [or conduct] is one that
promotes . . . or one that suppresses competition.”109 Similarly, the
Collaboration Guidelines define the rule of reason approach as an
“analysis [that] focuses on the state of competition with, as compared
to without, the relevant [horizontal] agreement” between the
competitors.110 The purpose of the rule of reason is to recognize that
certain restraints on competition are necessary if the collaborators’
“product is to be available at all.”111
The first step a plaintiff must satisfy under the rule of reason is
to prove that the defendant’s “alleged conduct or agreement . . .
produces . . . anticompetitive effects within the relevant product and
geographic markets.”112 The plaintiff can prove this by
demonstrating the “existence of actual anticompetitive effects” of the
defendant’s agreement or conduct or that the defendant has market

108. 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before
and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable.
The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.”). The rule of reason was
first suggested in an early English case, Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. (Q.B.) 347. At
issue in that case was a promise by a seller of a bakery that he would not compete with his
purchaser. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978). The Mitchel
court upheld the covenant as reasonable because the long-term benefits of increasing the
business’s marketability outweighed any negative effects on competition. Id. at 688–89.
109. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 691.
110. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 10. “The central
question is whether the relevant agreement likely harms competition by increasing the ability or
incentive profitably to raise price above or reduce output, quality, service, or innovation below
what likely would prevail in the absence of the relevant agreement.” Id.
111. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984). Even without
the creation of a new product, there may be efficiencies that justify the application of the rule of
reason. For example, a restraint that produces efficiencies, cuts cost, or increases the quality of a
product receives treatment under the rule of reason. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
112. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 830 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting
United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1983)).
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power113 in a particular market for goods and services.114 For
example, in TYR Sport, Inc. v. Warnaco Swimwear, Inc.,115 a district
court in the Central District of California held that TYR Sport met its
burden of proof regarding the defendant’s market power by
providing sufficient evidence that the market for performance
swimwear in the United States was a distinct market, separate from
the international market.116 Sometimes, however, the plaintiff and
defendant offer conflicting sets of data that frame the scope of the
relevant market to each party’s benefit, making it difficult for the
court to accept one party’s definition over the other’s.117 In these
circumstances, the definition of the relevant market is left to the
jury.118
If the plaintiff meets the initial burden of proving actual
anticompetitive effects or adequate market power, the defendant is
113. The Supreme Court has defined market power as “the ability to raise prices above those
that would be charged in a competitive market.” NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 n.38. Market power may
be proven through “evidence of specific conduct undertaken by the defendant that indicates he
has the power to affect price or exclude competition,” or “alternatively, market power may be
presumed if the defendant controls a large enough share of the relevant market.” United States v.
Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 239 (2d Cir. 2003). A relevant market is made up of two types of
markets: a geographic market and a product market. Little Rock Cardiology Clinic PA v. Baptist
Health, 591 F.3d 591, 596 (8th Cir. 2009). A geographic market is the “geographic area ‘in which
the seller operates and to which . . . purchasers can practicably turn for supplies.’” Id. at 598
(quoting Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961)). A court defines the
size of a geographic market by considering several factors such as “‘[p]rice data and such
corroborative factors as transportation costs, delivery limitations, customer convenience and
preference, and the location and facilities of other producers and distributors.’” Lantec, Inc. v.
Novell, Inc., 306 F.3d 1003, 1027 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting T. Harris Young & Assocs., Inc. v.
Marquette Elec., Inc., 931 F.2d 816, 823 (11th Cir. 1991)). Product market, on the other hand, is
defined as being “composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes
for which they are produced—price, use and qualities considered.” United States v. E. I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956).
114. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 610 F.3d at 830.
115. 709 F. Supp. 2d 802 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
116. Id. at 816. The court found relevant a number of factors in holding that the U.S. market
for swimwear was distinct from the international market. For example, the Executive Vice
President of TYR Sport testified to numerous barriers to competition, including “1) the ability to
provide local technical support; 2) on-the-ground customer service networks able to quickly
respond to the needs of elite swim teams; 3) relationships with athletes, coaches, and swim
directors; 4) cultural differences in suit preferences; [and] 5) differences in physiology of
swimmers from country to country . . . .” Id.
117. Meijer, Inc. v. Barr Pharm., Inc., 572 F. Supp. 2d 38, 62 (D.D.C. 2008).
118. Id. For example, in Meijer, Inc. v. Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a district court in the
District of Columbia left the definition of the oral contraceptive market to the jury because both
the plaintiff and defendant defined the relevant market to their own benefit, which left the court
with a disputed version of the defined market. Id.
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given the opportunity to prove that its conduct or agreement
“promotes a sufficiently procompetitive objective.”119 If the
defendant is unable to offer any procompetitive justifications, the
inquiry ends and the challenged restraint is illegal under the rule of
reason.120 For example, in United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.,121 the
DOJ challenged Visa and Mastercard’s exclusionary rule, which
“prohibit[ed] members of their networks from issuing American
Express or Discover cards.”122 There the court rejected the
defendant’s proposed procompetitive justification that the
exclusionary rule served to “promote ‘cohesion’ within the
Mastercard and Visa networks.” The Second Circuit upheld the
district court’s finding that the exclusionary rule was not necessary to
promote cohesion and that, even if it was, its precompetitive effects
did not outweigh its anticompetitive ones.123 If, however, the
defendant offers sound procompetitive justifications, the plaintiff
then must prove that these proffered justifications are not
“reasonably necessary” to accomplish the defendant’s objective.124
The Collaboration Guidelines follow a similar approach.125 First,
either the FTC or the DOJ begins by examining the nature of the
defendant’s agreement to determine whether it has caused
anticompetitive harm.126 If no such harm is evident, the inquiry
ends.127 If the possibility of anticompetitive harm is clearly evident,
or if it has resulted, the agencies “challenge such agreements without
a detailed market analysis.”128 If the agreement at issue indicates the
possibility of anticompetitive harm, the agencies scrutinize the
defendant’s agreement by conducting a detailed market analysis.129
119. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 610 F.3d at 830.
120. See id.
121. 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003).
122. Id. at 234, 237.
123. Id.
124. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 610 F.3d at 830.
125. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 30, at 10–12.
126. Id. at 10.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 10–11.
129. Id. at 11. At the market-analysis stage, the agencies look at several factors, including
whether an agreement is “exclusive or non-exclusive,” the “duration of the collaboration,” and
“whether entry [into the market] would be timely, likely, and sufficient to deter or counteract any
anticompetitive harms.” Id. If no anticompetitive harm is apparent, the inquiry ends and the court
will not find a Section 1 violation. Id. If the market analysis reveals anticompetitive harm, the
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The Supreme Court first applied the rule of reason in Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. CBS, which involved a horizontal agreement that fixed
a common price for the licensing of musical compositions.130 In
doing so, the Court acknowledged that federal courts should initially
consider whether a restraint “appears to be one that would always or
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”131
Following its decision in Broadcast Music, Inc., the Supreme Court
used the rule of reason to analyze other horizontal agreements with
potential efficiency justifications.132 In NCAA v. Board of Regents of
the University of Oklahoma,133 the Court applied the rule of reason to
an agreement limiting the number of times that a college sports team
from the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) could
appear on television as well as the fees that these teams could receive
from the networks.134 Although the agreement at issue was a
horizontal price fixing and output limitation agreement that would
have been automatically illegal under the per se approach, the Court
applied the rule of reason because the restraint at issue “involve[d]
an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are
essential if the product is to be available at all.”135 The Court
continued this trend, expanding the application of the rule of reason

agency “examine[s] whether the relevant agreement is reasonably necessary to achieve
procompetitive benefits that likely would offset any anticompetitive harms.” Id. at 11–12.
130. 441 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1979).
131. Id. at 19–20.
132. Piraino, supra note 4, at 1758.
133. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
134. Id. at 94.
135. Id. at 99–101. The Court ultimately struck down the defendant’s procompetitive
justifications for the agreement since the television plan did not promote a competitive balance
among amateur athletic teams. Id. at 117–20. The Court believed that protecting live attendance
was not a legitimate goal and that the NCAA’s restraint did not help to protect it. Id. at 115–17.
Additionally, it is important to note that the creation of a new product is not a necessary
prerequisite to trigger the application of the rule of reason. The rule of reason can also apply if the
defendant’s conduct or agreement creates procompetitive efficiencies. See supra Part II.B.2.
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throughout the 1980s.136 Today, the rule of reason is the most
common method of evaluating horizontal restraints on trade.137
3. Application of the Quick Look Approach
by the Federal Courts
The quick look approach is an intermediate standard that
“applies in cases where per se condemnation is inappropriate but
where no elaborate industry analysis [under the rule of reason] is
required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of an
inherently suspect restraint.”138 Under the quick look approach, the
defendant’s restraint carries a presumption of anticompetitiveness
that the defendant can rebut only by offering procompetitive
efficiencies that justify the restraint.139 Thus, the court initially tries
to determine whether the restraint carries obvious anticompetitive
effects.140 At this level, the inquiry is focused on whether “an
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could
conclude that the arrangements in question would have an
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”141 Where the
effect of a horizontal restraint appears complex on its face, however,
“assumption[s] alone will not do.”142 Instead, a court must properly
identify the anticompetitive effects of a restraint and determine
whether those effects are actually anticompetitive.143
Once the court has clearly decided that the effects of the
restraint are anticompetitive, the burden shifts to the defendant to
offer “some competitive justification” for the restraint.144 If the

136. See FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458 (1986) (holding that although the
conduct at issue resembled a group boycott that would normally be deemed per se illegal, the rule
of reason should apply because the economic impact of the horizontal agreement was not
immediately obvious); Nw. Wholesale Stationers v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284,
298 (1985) (holding that the per se approach should not apply since a “mere allegation of a
concerted refusal to deal does not suffice [as anticompetitive conduct] because not all concerted
refusals to deal are predominantly anticompetitive”).
137. Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 829–30 (3d Cir. 2010).
138. Id. at 830 (quoting United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1983)).
139. Id. at 831.
140. Id.
141. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
142. Id. at 775 n.12.
143. Id.
144. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 610 F.3d at 831 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993)).
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defendant cannot carry this burden, then the restraint is illegal under
a quick look analysis.145 If, however, the defendant is able to offer a
legitimate procompetitive justification for the restraint, the court
abandons the quick look approach and engages in a rule of reason
analysis.146
While the Court in NCAA used the rule of reason to analyze the
restraints at issue, it stated that this approach can sometimes be
applied “in the twinkling of an eye”147—language that some legal
scholars consider to be the origin of the quick look approach.148 In
NCAA, the NCAA argued that its agreement limiting collegiate
sports’ teams television appearances did not have “significant
anticompetitive effects” because the NCAA possessed no market
power.149 The Court rejected this argument, holding that “the
absence of proof of market power does not justify a naked restriction
on price or output.”150 According to the Court, “when there is an
agreement not to compete in terms of price or output, ‘no elaborate
industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive
character of such an agreement.’”151 The Court has “never required
proof of market power in such a case.”152 Therefore, even in the
absence of a detailed market analysis, a naked restraint on price and
output requires some competitive justification.
Along with NCAA, the Court’s decision in FTC v. Indiana
Federation of Dentists153 is also regarded as paving the way for the
quick look approach.154 In Indiana Federation of Dentists, a group of
professional dentists (the “Federation”), made an argument similar to
the NCAA plaintiffs’: the FTC could not identify a relevant market in
which the Federation restrained trade, and therefore the Federation

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.39 (1984) (quoting
PHILLIP AREEDA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE “RULE OF REASON” IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS:
GENERAL ISSUES 37–38 (1981)).
148. James T. McKeown, The Economics of Competitive Balance: Sports Antitrust Claims
After American Needle, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 517, 531 n.54 (2011).
149. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 110.
153. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
154. McKeown, supra note 148, at 530–31.
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did not unreasonably restrain trade.155 In rejecting the FTC’s
argument, the Indiana Federation of Dentists Court reaffirmed its
decision in NCAA by holding that the FTC’s failure to engage in a
detailed market analysis did not defeat the FTC’s finding that the
Federation’s conduct was illegal under the rule of reason.156
According to the Court, because the purpose of market analysis is to
determine whether an agreement or conduct can adversely affect
competition, “‘proof of actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction
of output,’ can obviate the need for an inquiry into market power.”157
Thus, the Court held that the Federation violated Section 1 under the
rule of reason and did not provide a detailed analysis of market
power.158
III. WHERE DO WE DRAW THE LINE,
IF A LINE CAN BE DRAWN AT ALL?
Although it may seem that the Court has clearly established
three approaches to analyze horizontal restraints that potentially
violate Section 1, the use of these approaches has created a great deal
of uncertainty among lower federal courts and American firms.159
Oftentimes it is difficult to see how courts decide which approach to
apply. One way to offer insight into this problem is to look at how
the federal courts have limited or expanded the application of these
approaches. The next section looks at lower federal court decisions
in the past five years and shows how courts continue to use the rule
of reason while limiting the use of the per se and quick look
approaches.
A. Limits on the Per Se Approach
The most significant limit that the Supreme Court has placed on
the per se approach was to preclude its application where the
restraint on competition produces procompetitive efficiencies or is

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460.
Id.
Id. at 460–61.
Id.
See Gustman & Anderson, supra note 1, at 205.
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“essential if the product is to be available at all.”160 The Supreme
Court, along with the lower federal courts, has consistently upheld
this limitation.161 For example, when defendants are members of a
joint venture that requires a certain degree of cooperation to compete
in the relevant market or to market a product, any horizontal restraint
that they impose will be subject to the rule of reason as long as most
of their regulatory controls are procompetitive.162 Thus, even if the
restraint at issue is a price-fixing agreement, courts apply the rule of
reason because the horizontal agreement is necessary for the joint
venture to function.163
In its 2010 decision, a court in the Northern District of Illinois in
In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litigation164 did not apply the per se
approach when considering the plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment, even though it could have.165 The plaintiffs brought suit
against producers of sulfuric acid, alleging that these producers
conspired “to reduce the output and fix the price of sulfuric acid in
Canada and the United States.”166 In analyzing whether the plaintiffs
offered enough facts to prove that the defendants’ restraint was per
se illegal, the court exercised caution in deciding whether to apply
the per se approach.167 According to the court, a plaintiff cannot

160. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984); e.g., Broad.
Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979). A horizontal restraint does not always have to produce
a new product in order to trigger the application of the rule of reason. See supra note 5.
161. E.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216 (2010); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547
U.S. 1, 7 (2006); Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 831 (3d Cir. 2010); In
re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1014 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
162. See In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d at 1014.
163. Id.
164. 743 F. Supp. 2d 827 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
165. Id. at 865.
166. Id. at 835. The plaintiffs argued that the rule of reason should not apply and instead
focused on the application of the per se approach. Id. at 864. The plaintiffs did not discuss the
challenged practices’ anticompetitive effects or the defendants’ market power in the relevant
market. Id. As a result, the court held that the plaintiffs waived their rule of reason argument. Id.
at 865.
167. Id. The defendants first argued that the courts do not have enough experience with their
conduct to be able to apply the per se approach. Id. at 869. The court rejected this argument,
holding that the defendants’ alleged agreement is a classic price-fixing and output-restriction
agreement. Id. Next, under the ancillary restraints doctrine, the defendants argued that the outputreduction agreements served to make their joint venture successful. Id. at 872. The court found
the defendants’ argument “problematic.” Id. It held that “a restraint is only ancillary if it [is]
necessary to achieve otherwise unattainable procompetitive benefits.” Id. According to the court,
a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendants’ conduct was not ancillary. Id. at 874. But
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benefit from the per se standard at trial unless one could conclude
from the undisputed facts in the case that the challenged conduct was
“of the type” that is customarily regarded as illegal per se.168
Because the plaintiffs were unable to present undisputed facts
that the defendants’ conduct was per se illegal, the court did not
decide whether it could apply the per se approach.169 Instead, it held
that there were “enough issues of contested material fact to preclude
both summary judgment on the merits and the determination of the
appropriate legal standard.”170 However, the court noted that if it
became clear that the defendants acted in the way that the plaintiffs
described, the defendants’ conduct would constitute a per se
violation.171 The holding in In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust Litigation
may foreshadow a trend toward exercising a cautious reluctance to
apply the per se approach to alleged Section 1 violations, even if it is
potentially applicable.
The Supreme Court in Texaco Inc. v. Dagher172 also limited the
use of the per se approach by applying the rule of reason when
plaintiffs challenged the “core activity” of a joint venture.173
Consistent with Dagher, a California district court in In re ATM Fee
Antitrust Litigation174 applied the rule of reason when the plaintiffs
challenged a joint venture’s right to set an interchange network fee—
an activity that the court determined was at the “core” of the joint
venture.175 According to the court, “Dagher teaches that such

because a dispute remained over whether such conduct was ancillary, the court could not
determine whether the per se or rule of reason should apply. Id.
168. Id. at 865.
169. See id. at 887.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
173. Id. at 5. The joint venture in Dagher was formed by two oil companies that consolidated
to refine and sell gasoline in the United States. Id. at 3. After the joint venture set a single price
for both brands of gasoline, the plaintiffs challenged the joint venture’s agreement to set a unified
price. Id. at 4. The Supreme Court held this practice to be part of the joint venture’s “core
activity.” Id. at 7–8. The Court further precluded the application of the per se approach to joint
ventures that set their own prices. According to the Court, a single entity that sets its own prices is
not guilty of price fixing. Id. at 6. While this activity may be “price fixing in the literal sense, it is
not price fixing in the antitrust sense.” Id. For more analysis on what a “core” activity is, see infra
Part IV.A and note 230.
174. 554 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
175. See id. at 1013.
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challenges [to the joint venture’s core activity] must be analyzed
under the rule of reason.”176
Indeed, the federal courts are universally reluctant to expand the
application of the per se approach.177 This reluctance is appropriate
given the goals of antitrust law. Joint ventures are formed to make
production more efficient, develop more innovative products, and
deliver the best price possible to the consumer.178 Courts do not want
to inhibit their growth by blindly holding a joint venture’s conduct
per se illegal when it can instead analyze and weigh the
procompetitive efficiencies of the alleged anticompetitive restraint to
determine Section 1 legality.179 Doing so would make it more
difficult for American firms to provide the most competitive price to
the consumer.
B. Limits on the Rule of Reason
Because the rule of reason has become the default analysis to
determine the legality of a horizontal restraint, the courts have not
placed many limits on its application.180 In fact, many of the limits
placed on the per se approach have in turn expanded the application
of the rule of reason.181 At the same time, where per se treatment is

176. Id. The court cited to NCAA, pointing out that the Supreme Court held that when
“horizontal agreements are necessary for the functioning of a joint venture, all horizontal
agreements among members of that venture . . . should be subject to the Rule of Reason.” Id. at
1014. The court pointed out that the holding in NCAA would compel it to apply the rule of reason
to the restraint at issue. Id. at 1015. But, the court turned to Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of
Realtors, a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case that has limited the application of NCAA. Id. In
Freeman, the Ninth Circuit held that for NCAA to apply, “the particular restraint at issue must be
‘reasonably ancillary to the legitimate cooperative aspects of the [joint] venture.’” Id. (quoting
Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003)). Thus, defendants
must prove two things: that their joint venture requires a horizontal restraint and that the
particular restraint is ancillary to the joint venture’s legitimate business operations. Id. The court
in In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litigation held that the defendant’s conduct also fell under the
Freeman limitation, making the rule of reason the proper approach. See id. at 1017.
177. See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006); In re Sulfuric Acid Antitrust
Litig., 743 F. Supp. 2d 827, 887 (N.D. Ill. 2010); In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d
at 1014.
178. Piraino, supra note 2, at 3–4.
179. Piraino, supra note 74, at 651.
180. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216 (2010); Deutscher Tennis Bund
v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 829–30 (3d Cir. 2010); In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 554 F.
Supp. 2d at 1014.
181. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100–01 (1984);
Broad. Music Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979).
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appropriate, the rule of reason has a limited application.182 For
example, when the anticompetitive effects of a horizontal restraint
are unclear, courts use the rule of reason rather than the per se
approach so that they can fully consider the procompetitive
justifications of the alleged restraint.183 Conversely, when a restraint
is plainly anticompetitive, courts do not need to engage in an
extensive analysis of the relevant market or defendant’s market
power. Accordingly, they use the per se approach, and not the rule of
reason, to find such restraints illegal.184 Thus, the per se approach
and the rule of reason function as a check on each other.
C. Limits on the Quick Look Approach
In California Dental Ass’n v. FTC,185 the Supreme Court held
that it was inappropriate to apply the quick look approach to
advertising restrictions placed on members of the California Dental
Association because the restrictions’ anticompetitive effects were not
“obvious.”186 In reaching its decision, the Court made clear that the
quick look approach should only be applied when the deciding court
“has properly identified the theoretical basis for the anticompetitive
effects and considered whether the effects actually are
anticompetitive.”187 If the conduct “might plausibly be thought to
have a net procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all on
competition,” then the quick look approach is not applicable.188
Thus, the Court recognized the quick look approach while
simultaneously placing limits on it.
Since the Court’s decision in California Dental, subsequent
lower federal courts have been careful in applying the quick look

182. See Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 7–8. In Broadcast Music, Inc., the court stated in
dicta that there is no need to analyze defendants’ conduct or agreement under the rule of reason
when it is “plainly anticompetitive.” Id. Instead, such an agreement or conduct is declared per se
illegal. Id.
183. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to Collaborations Among
Competitors, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1143–44 (2001) (stating that where the economic effects of
a defendant’s conduct or agreement is ambiguous, the courts engage in a detailed analysis of the
defendant’s restraint on the relevant market under the rule of reason).
184. See Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 7–8.
185. 526 U.S. 756 (1999).
186. Id. at 774, 759.
187. See id. at 775 n.12.
188. See id. at 771.
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approach.189 For example, in 2010, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc.190 held that
applying the quick look approach to an agreement reorganizing the
ATP tennis tour to increase popularity and exposure was not
appropriate because “the definition of the relevant [tennis] market
was one of the most contested issues at trial.”191 According to the
court, a thorough market analysis was necessary because the relevant
market was not “sufficiently well-known or defined” to allow a court
to decide whether the reorganization agreement was
anticompetitive.192 Similarly, in 2011, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc.193 refused to
apply the quick look approach to an agreement among a group of
supermarket competitors to share revenues in the event of a strike or
lockout.194 According to the court, the “unique features of the
agreement”—along with “the uncertain effects these features had on
the grocers’ competitive behavior”—were “not obvious.”195 The
court specifically noted that in order to reach a confident conclusion
about the anticompetitive effects of the agreement, “further
development of the record [was] required.”196 The Ninth Circuit
seems to have learned its lesson after the Supreme Court overturned
its decision in California Dental because in Harris it did not apply
the quick look approach to an agreement whose anticompetitive
effects were unclear.
Despite the infrequent use of the quick look approach197 by the
federal courts in the last five years, in 2008, the court in North Texas
189. E.g., California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc);
Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2010).
190. 610 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2010).
191. Id. at 832. This case highlights the problem that under the rule of reason, courts focus too
heavily on the defendant’s market power in a relevant market in order to decide whether the
defendant’s restraint is anticompetitive. For more on this problem, see infra Part IV.C.
192. Id. Additionally, even if the anticompetitive effects of the agreement were obvious, the
quick look analysis still would have been inappropriate because the defendants offered sound
procompetitive justifications. Id. at 833. According to the court, once a defendant offers such
procompetitive justifications, the quick look presumption disappears and a full-scale rule of
reason analysis should be used. Id.
193. 651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
194. Id. at 1122, 1137.
195. Id. at 1137.
196. Id.
197. See Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1413 (2009).
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Specialty Physicians v. FTC198 applied it appropriately.199 There, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the “net anticompetitive
effects of the [North Texas Specialty Physicians’] NTSP’s practices
were obvious” and that the procompetitive justifications offered by
the NTSP did not “result in a net procompetitive effect.”200 In its
holding, the NTSP court carefully noted that one reason that the
Supreme Court found the quick look approach improper in
California Dental was because the Ninth Circuit used empirical
evidence to determine whether the defendant’s conduct resulted in
any adverse anticompetitive effects.201 According to the Supreme
Court, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on empirical evidence showed that
it was lenient in “its enquiry into evidence of the restrictions’
anticompetitive effects.”202 Unlike the Ninth Circuit in California
Dental, the FTC in North Texas Specialty Physicians (NTSP) “relied
on the theoretical basis for the anticompetitive and procompetitive
effects of NTSP’s” conduct.203 Thus, the NTSP court, through a
“quick look,” held that the “NTSP engaged in concerted action to

198. 528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008).
199. Id. at 363.
200. Id. at 362–63. The NTSP is an organization of independent physicians whose purpose is
to “assemble physician groups and negotiate contracts between these groups and insurance
[companies].” Id. at 352. The written contract that NTSP had with each of its physicians obligated
the physician to refrain from pursuing an offer from an insurance company that the NTSP was
negotiating with. Id. at 353. “This either foreclosed or delayed negotiations between these
[insurance companies] and the physicians who were willing to accept a lower fee than the
minimum fee determined by the NTSP.” Id. at 363. “If the NTSP did not consummate a contract
with [the insurance company] in its negotiations, then [the insurance company’s] ability to
bargain directly with the physician was delayed.” Id. As a result, the insurance company’s
patients who were in need of medical services did not have access to NTSP’s physicians while
negotiations were ongoing, which in turn reduced the number of competing physicians. Id. at 364.
201. Id. at 362.
202. Id. (quoting Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 776 (1999)).
203. Id. Under the Physician Participation Agreement between NTSP and a physician, if the
NTSP was negotiating with a certain payor, the physician was not allowed to pursue an offer
from that payor. Id. at 363. Therefore, if a physician was willing to accept from the payor a lower
fee than the minimum required by the NTSP, he or she was prevented from doing so because the
NTSP was already in talks with that payor. Id. The court inferred that if the NTSP closed the deal
with a payor, the agreed-upon fee between the payor and the NTSP “would be higher than the
minimum fees . . . that a NTSP member physician . . . w[as] willing to accept . . . .” Id. The FTC
supported this through expert testimony. Id. Furthermore, turning to the issue of NTSP’s
procompetitive justifications, the court rejected them, citing to “significant gaps in logic.” Id. at
368. The court held that NTSP’s procompetitive justifications “do not meet the ‘might plausibly
be thought to have a net procompetitive effect, or possibly no effect at all . . .’ threshold.” Id. at
370.
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increase its bargaining power,” which amounted to a horizontal price
fixing agreement.204 The procompetitive justifications offered by the
NTSP were not sufficient to overcome this finding.205
IV. INCONSISTENCIES AND UNCERTAINTIES
AMONG THE FEDERAL COURTS
In expanding the rule of reason while significantly limiting the
per se and quick look approaches, the federal courts have struggled
to distinguish when each approach should apply. Instead of
attempting to resolve this confusion, Justice Souter in California
Dental compounded it: after holding that the quick look approach
was inappropriate, Justice Souter went on to say,
[O]ur categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are
less fixed than terms like “per se,” “quick look,” and “rule
of reason” tend to make them appear . . . . [T]here is
generally no categorical line to be drawn between restraints
that give rise to an intuitively obvious inference of
anticompetitive effect and those that call for more detailed
treatment. What is required, rather, is an enquiry meet for
the case, looking to the circumstances, details, and logic of
a restraint.206
As this part demonstrates, the federal courts still struggle with
the Supreme Court’s inability to articulate clear and consistent
standards to analyze horizontal restraints under Section 1.
A. The Ancillary Restraints Doctrine
and Procompetitive Justifications
The inability to clearly distinguish between the per se approach
and rule of reason existed long before the Supreme Court began
using the rule of reason as the dominant approach in evaluating

204. Id. at 367, 370.
205. Id. at 368–70.
206. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. at 779–81. Justice Souter, in the majority opinion,
suggested yet another type of analysis that would fall between the quick look approach and the
rule of reason. Id. Justice Souter pointed out that the plaintiffs had not shown the “obvious
anticompetitive effect” that would trigger the quick look approach. Id. at 778. At the same time,
Justice Souter wrote that this does “not . . . necessarily . . . call for the fullest market analysis”
under the rule of reason. Id. at 779. According to the Court, “a less quick look” was required to
determine the competitiveness of the defendant’s advertising restrictions. Id. at 781.
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horizontal restraints. In United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,207
Topco Associates (“Topco”), a group of twenty-five regional
supermarket chains, adopted “territorial restraints” to create a private
label system to compete with larger supermarket chains.208 The
district court found these territorial restraints to be procompetitive
because they would enhance competition between Topco’s members
and other supermarket chains.209 In ignoring the potential benefits of
Topco’s restraints, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s
decision and held these restraints to be per se unlawful.210 Justice
Burger, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the majority did not
examine whether the district court’s finding was correct but instead
essentially said that “the District Court had no business examining
Topco’s practices under the ‘rule of reason.’”211 The majority’s
holding contradicted Judge Taft’s formulation of the ancillary
restraints doctrine in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
which stated that if a restraint is ancillary, it is exempt from per se
treatment.212 The Court moved away from Topco’s reasoning in its
subsequent decisions in Broadcast Music, Inc. and NCAA. Both cases
involved a horizontal restraint on price competition, but in both
cases, the Supreme Court refused to apply the per se rule because the
horizontal restraint was necessary to ensure the product’s
availability.213
Lower federal courts struggled with the Topco decision after the
Supreme Court decided Broadcast Music, Inc. and NCAA. For
example, in Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.,214
the D.C. Circuit Court pointed out that its holding on the legality of
Atlas Van Lines’s current carrier policy would differ depending on
whether it followed the Topco line of reasoning or the Broadcast

207. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
208. Alan J. Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of the
Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 461, 469 (2000).
209. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. at 605–06.
210. Id. at 608.
211. Id. at 614 (Burger, J., dissenting).
212. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(citing United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282–83 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175
U.S. 211 (1899)).
213. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100–01 (1984); Broad.
Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979).
214. 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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Music, Inc. and NCAA line of reasoning.215 Under Topco, the
defendant’s restraint would have been per se illegal under Section
1.216 Under Broadcast Music, Inc. and NCAA, the restraint imposed
by the defendant would not have violated Section 1 because it was
ancillary.217 The court in Rothery Storage ultimately adopted the
Broadcast Music, Inc. and NCAA reasoning and held that the
defendant’s conduct did not violate Section 1.218 According to the
court, the restraint was ancillary to the defendant’s joint venture and
did not “suppress market competition . . . [or] decrease output.”219 In
reaching its decision, the court pointed out that the holdings of
Broadcast Music, Inc. and NCAA overturned Topco.220 Yet the
Supreme Court has not done so.221
Confusion is further apparent when courts analyze whether a
restraint is ancillary under the ancillary restraints doctrine. The lower
federal courts have failed to uniformly distinguish between naked
restraints—where the per se approach applies—and ancillary
restraints—where the rule of reason applies.222 For example, “[s]ome
courts have found that, in order to be ancillary, restraints must be
‘plausibly related’ to a venture’s pro-competitive effects.”223 Others
215. Id. at 229. In Rothery Storage, Atlas Van Lines was a national moving company that
contracted with independent moving companies across the nation to provide moving services to
individuals and businesses. Id. at 211. Atlas Van Lines executed a standard contract with its
independent agents, which prohibited the agents from affiliating or dealing with any other van
line. Id. In 1979, the moving industry became deregulated and this produced a free-rider problem
for Atlas. Id. at 212. As a result, Atlas instituted a new policy that allowed “any carrier agent
already affiliated with Atlas [to] continue to exercise independent interstate authority only by
transferring its independent interstate authority to a separate corporation with a new name.” Id. at
213. This, in effect, rendered Atlas’s services or facilities unavailable to these new entities. Id.
216. Id. at 229.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Despite moving away from Topco in cases like Broadcast Music, Inc. and NCAA, the
Supreme Court cited to it in Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc. In Palmer, the Court held that an
agreement between two bar test-preparation companies to divide territories and not compete in
each other’s territories was per se illegal. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1990).
The Court cited its decision in Topco, which held that “‘an agreement between competitors . . . to
allocate territories in order to minimize competition’” is illegal. Id. at 49 (quoting United States v.
Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972)). This signals that the Court is not ready to do
away with Topco just yet.
222. Kolasky, supra note 27, at 135.
223. Piraino, supra note 9, at 745–46. California Dental supports the idea that a restraint must
be plausibly related to the procompetitive effects of a joint venture to be ancillary. Id. at 746.
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“have concluded that the restraints must be ‘reasonably related’ to
such effects.”224 Also, a few courts have also held “that the restraints
must be ‘essential’ to achieving the effects.”225 The Supreme Court
had a chance to clarify the use of the ancillary restraints doctrine and
provide guidance on how the courts should distinguish between
naked and ancillary restraints.226 Instead, the Court created more
confusion.
In Dagher, Texaco Incorporated and Shell Oil Company agreed
to form a joint venture, Equilon Enterprises, to “refine and sell
gasoline in the Western United States.”227 Through Equilon, Texaco
and Shell Oil agreed to a pricing policy that set the price of gasoline
that they sold.228 The Court held that the ancillary restraints doctrine
did not apply to the defendants’ joint venture because the plaintiffs
were challenging the core activity of Equilon—namely, the pricing
of its product, gasoline.229 Yet the Court failed to explain why it
considered the pricing of Equilon’s gasoline a “core activity” of the
joint venture.230 At the same time, the Court held that even if the
ancillary restraints doctrine had applied, Equilon’s pricing policy
was “clearly ancillary to the sale of its own products.”231 This
224. Id. at 746. Broadcast Music, Inc. supports the idea that a restraint must be reasonably
related to the procompetitive effects of a joint venture to be ancillary. Id.
225. Id.
226. See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
227. Id. at 3.
228. Id. at 6.
229. Id. at 7–8.
230. One possible interpretation of what the Court meant in its discussion of the “core
activity” of a joint venture is that core activity is “the opposite of non-venture activity.” Holden,
supra note 48, at 1477. Thus, if a specific restraint involves a core activity, as opposed to a
nonventure activity, then the ancillary restraints doctrine cannot be the basis of finding that
restraint unlawful. Id. Alternatively, analysis of what constitutes a joint venture’s core activity
“could be an important new qualifier on the antitrust legal standards applied to joint ventures, or
something in between.” Id. However, “it is clear that the pricing decisions of a legitimate,
integrated joint venture are a ‘core’ activity to which ancillary restraints doctrine simply does not
apply.” Id. This raises a question of the scope of what a “core activity” is. For example, if “core
activity” covers all activities of a joint venture, how does this differ from an ancillary restraint?
The answer to this question, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
231. Dagher, 547 U.S. at 8. The Ninth Circuit considered Texaco as an efficiency-enhancing
joint venture. Holden, supra note 48, at 1476. However, this did not mean that the parties had
“carte blanche ‘to do anything they please[d] with full immunity from per se analysis.’” Id.
(quoting Dagher v. Saudi Ref., Inc., 369 F.3d 1108, 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d sub nom. Texaco
Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1). According to the Ninth Circuit, the issue involving joint ventures is
“whether the price fixing is 'naked' (in which case the restraint is per se illegal) or 'ancillary' (in
which case it is not).” Id.
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decision has left many courts and legal scholars wondering what
constitutes a “core activity” of a joint venture and why the ancillary
restraints doctrine did not apply where Equilon’s pricing policy was
ancillary.232
B. Distinguishing Between
the Rule of Reason and Per Se Approach
with Greater Confidence
A widespread belief among the courts and legal scholars that a
great deal of uncertainty exists in the area of horizontal restraints is
nothing new.233 Considerable confusion is still apparent, especially in
the federal courts in California.234 For example, in 2008, a district
court in the Northern District of California in In re ATM Fee
Antitrust Litigation held that although the rule of reason should apply
to an agreement fixing prices of interchange fees in the Star ATM
network, “there remains serious doctrinal confusion over the proper
analysis of cooperative arrangements among competitors.”235 The
court certified a request to the Ninth Circuit to determine whether the
plaintiff’s antitrust claim was correctly decided under the rule of
reason or whether the per se approach should have been used
instead.236
This is not the only confusion that exists in California. In
California ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc.,237 the Ninth Circuit
struggled in applying the per se approach, the rule of reason, and the
quick look approach.238 Initially, a California district court denied the
232. See Holden, supra note 48, at 1477.
233. Piraino, supra note 2, at 12.
234. See, e.g., California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (en
banc); In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
235. In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 554 F. Supp. 2d at 1017 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
236. Id. The Ninth Circuit declined to address the question. In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig.,
768 F. Supp. 2d 984, 989 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
237. 615 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d en banc sub nom. Harris, 651 F.3d 1118. At issue in
this case was a collective bargaining agreement on the eve of expiration between local chapters of
a union and the defendants, three large supermarket chains. Id. at 1175. The defendant grocers
entered into a Mutual Strike Assistance Agreement with each other. Id. This agreement contained
a “revenue sharing agreement,” which stated, “in the event of a lockout or strike, any firm that
earned revenues above its historical share of the combined revenues of all four firms would
redistribute 15% of those surplus revenues among the other chains according to a fixed formula.”
Id. at 1175–76.
238. See id. at 1182–84.
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state’s motion for summary judgment, which asked the court to
declare the defendants’ revenue-sharing agreement per se illegal or,
alternatively, unlawful under the quick look approach.239 The State
of California appealed to the Ninth Circuit.240 Here, the court took
into account Justice Souter’s warning in California Dental that there
is “no bright-line” distinction between the three categories of
analysis and that what is required is an “enquiry meet for the
case.”241
As a result, the court came up with a mixed approach: consider
“the history of [the] judicial experience with profit sharing
agreements, apply rudimentary economic principles to the meaning
and effects of the . . . agreement in question, and thoroughly analyze
the circumstances, details and logic of the agreement in order to
determine the likelihood of anticompetitive effects.”242 The next step
under this mixed approach is to consider the defendants’ offered
procompetitive justifications.243 The ultimate issue is whether, after
conducting this mixed-approach analysis, the court could reach a
“confident conclusion that the principal tendency of [the] defendants’
agreement [was] anticompetitive.”244 Using this approach, the Ninth
Circuit rejected the defendants’ procompetitive justifications and
held that the anticompetitive effects of the defendants’ agreement
were easily ascertainable.245 Thus, under this mixed approach, the
Ninth Circuit was able to confidently conclude that the agreement
violated Section 1 and that the rule of reason was not necessary.246
The Ninth Circuit subsequently reheard the case en banc247 and
held that the rule of reason was the proper approach for determining
the legality of the defendants’ revenue-sharing provision.248 The
Ninth Circuit held that the quick look approach was not appropriate
because “[t]he unique features of the arrangement among the
grocers . . . and the uncertain effect these features had on [their]
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 1177.
Id.
Id. at 1179 (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 758 (1999)).
Id. at 1183.
Id.
Id. at 1179.
Id. at 1189.
Id. at 1189, 1192.
California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
Id. at 1139.
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competitive behavior” rendered any anticompetitive effect of the
agreement not obvious.249 This holding is consistent with those of
other courts250 that have precluded a quick look application when a
restraint’s anticompetitive effects were not obvious, and it further
indicates that the Ninth Circuit has finally learned when to apply the
quick look approach.
As these cases demonstrate, courts still find it difficult to decide
which approach to apply. Yet a small number of recent lower federal
court decisions signal that these courts are distinguishing between
the rule of reason and per se approach with increasing confidence.251
For example, in Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court’s application of the
rule of reason to an agreement that reorganized the ATP Tennis Tour
in order to increase popularity and better compete with other sporting
events.252 First, the Third Circuit held that the district court correctly
determined that the per se approach should not apply to the ATP
Tennis Tour because, in a tennis tour, “horizontal restraints . . . are
essential if the product is to be available at all.”253 Next, the Third
Circuit determined that the district court properly declined to apply
the quick look approach because “the definition of the relevant
market was one of the most contested issues at trial.”254 Because the
relevant market was not properly defined, the quick look approach
was inappropriate.255 Furthermore, because the defendant offered
“‘sound procompetitive justifications,’” the district court correctly
shifted the analysis from the quick look approach to the rule of
reason.256

249. Id. at 1137. According to the court, because the length of the agreement among the
defendants was short and there were other supermarkets, or competitors, in the market, the
agreement among the defendants was “unique.” Id. Thus, the competitive effects of the agreement
were not clear enough to support application of the quick look approach. Id.
250. E.g., Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820 (3d Cir. 2010).
251. E.g., Deutscher Tennis Bund, 610 F.3d 820; Stanislaus Food Prods. Co. v. USS-POSCO
Indus., No. CV F 09-0560, 2010 WL 3521979 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2010).
252. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 610 F.3d at 824, 833.
253. Id. at 831 (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101
(1984)).
254. Id. at 832–33.
255. Id. at 832
256. Id. at 832–33.
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Additionally, in its order on a motion to dismiss, a court in the
Eastern District of California held in Stanislaus Food Products Co. v.
USS-POSCO Industries257 that the plaintiff failed to allege facts that
the defendants’ conduct violated both the per se and rule of reason.258
The court pointed out that the plaintiff, in its own brief, admitted that
the defendants “legitimately operated and competed with [other
manufacturers] without antitrust implications.”259 Accordingly, the
court held that the plaintiff had failed to allege that the defendants
engaged in anticompetitive conduct, thus precluding an application
of the per se approach.260 Furthermore, the court held that the rule of
reason was similarly inapplicable because the plaintiff had failed to
prove facts that the defendants unreasonably restrained trade.261
According to the court, the plaintiff did “not allege that the operation
of [the defendants] resulted in competitors exiting the market.”262
Because the plaintiff was unable to plead facts sufficient to trigger
either the per se approach or rule of reason, the court dismissed the
plaintiff’s claim.263 The district court did not demonstrate any
confusion in reaching its decision.
C. Problems with the Rule of Reason
While courts are distinguishing between the rule of reason and
per se approach with greater confidence, there are still problems
inherent in the application of the rule of reason. “The rule of reason
has been criticized for its inaccuracy, its poor administrability, its
subjectivity, its lack of transparency, and its yielding inconsistent
results.”264 Rather than clarifying these problems, the Supreme Court
and the circuit courts have focused instead on whether the per se or
rule of reason approach should apply and not on how the actual rule
of reason analysis should be carried out at the district court level.265

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

No. CV F 09-0560 LJO SMS, 2010 WL 3521979 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2010).
Id. at *23.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *24.
Id.
Id. at *23–24, *32.
Stucke, supra note 197, at 1421.
Piraino, supra note 9, at 739.
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As a result, district courts have little to work with when they engage
in an actual rule of reason analysis.266
Problems with the rule of reason do not affect only the courts.
Many plaintiffs are reluctant to initiate rule of reason cases because
of the high cost associated with proving an antitrust violation under
this approach.267 In order for the plaintiff to be successful under the
rule of reason, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s conduct
or agreement results in anticompetitive effects either by proving the
existence of actual anticompetitive effects or by demonstrating that
the defendant has market power in a particular market.268 Plaintiffs
often rely on circumstantial evidence to demonstrate market
power.269 For instance, the plaintiff may introduce evidence of a high
market share by offering expert testimony or documentary
evidence.270 Because so much of the defendant’s liability depends on
how broadly the judge or jury defines the relevant market, it is hardly
surprising that parties devote so many of their litigation resources to
framing the relevant market to each party’s benefit.271
What defines the relevant market in each case often becomes the
most contested issue at trial.272 As mentioned above in Part II.B, the
court in Meijer was unable to determine on summary judgment the
proper relevant market because the plaintiff and the defendant
presented conflicting definitions of the relevant market to support
their own positions. In Wampler v. Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co.,273 the issue of what constituted the proper geographic market
went on appeal to the Fifth Circuit.274 On appeal in Southeast
Missouri Hospital v. C.R. Bard, Inc.275 was the issue of what
266. Id. at 739–40.
267. Piraino, supra note 4, at 1761; Piraino, supra note 9, at 739.
268. See Piraino, supra note 4, at 1761–62.
269. Stucke, supra note 197, at 1425.
270. Piraino, supra note 4, at 1761.
271. See Stucke, supra note 197, at 1425–26; see also Meijer, Inc. v. Barr Pharm., Inc., 572 F.
Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2008) (stating that the relevant oral contraceptive market could not be
determined on summary judgment because both parties defined the relevant market to their own
advantage).
272. See Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 439 & n.2
(2010).
273. 597 F.3d 741 (5th Cir. 2010).
274. Id. at 743. The court held that appellants’ Section 1 claim failed because they were
unable to define a proper geographic market. Id. at 746.
275. 642 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2011).
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constituted the proper product submarket.276 While the majority in
that case held that the plaintiff failed to define a proper product
submarket, the dissent disagreed, arguing that there were factual
disputes regarding the scope of the relevant product market and the
defendant’s market power.277 These recent cases demonstrate that the
courts dedicate an unnecessary amount of time and number of
resources to analyzing the definition of the relevant market under the
rule of reason. In the majority of cases, the plaintiff fails to prove a
relevant product or geographic market and the claim is dismissed.278
As the Eighth Circuit has said, “Antitrust claims often rise or fall on
the definition of the relevant market.”279
V. SOLUTIONS
This Article has demonstrated that there remains a serious lack
of unity among the federal courts in applying Section 1 to horizontal
restraints. This lack of unity has led to confusion among the district
courts and circuit courts.280 In an attempt to simplify the confusion,
this part proposes three solutions that will help to clarify the law of
horizontal restraints under Section 1. Part V.A advocates for
abandoning the quick look approach. Part V.B then argues that, to
make things simpler, courts should either use the ancillary restraints
doctrine or look to the defendants’ procompetitive justifications in
determining whether to apply the rule of reason. If a court chooses
the ancillary restraints doctrine, it should use a “reasonably
necessary” standard to determine how related the ancillary restraint
is to a horizontal agreement. Finally, Part V.C offers several

276. Id. at 613. In the Eighth Circuit, a product market can contain well-defined submarkets.
Se. Mo. Hosp., 642 F.3d at 614 (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)).
To determine a submarket, the court listed a number of factors, including “public recognition of
its separate economic character, special uses or characteristics or production facilities, distinct
customers or prices, price sensitivity, and specialized vendors.” Id. at 614. In Southeast Missouri
Hospital, the plaintiff failed to establish a relevant submarket. Id. at 614–17.
277. Se. Mo. Hosp., 642 F.3d at 625 (Beam, J., dissenting).
278. See Little Rock Cardiology PA v. Baptist Health, 591 F.3d 591, 596 (8th Cir. 2009).
279. Id. (citing Bathke v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc., 64 F.3d 340, 345 (8th Cir. 1995))
(holding that the plaintiff erroneously defined the relevant product market, thereby precluding any
antitrust claim); see also Newcal Indus., Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir.
2008) (reversing the district court’s holding that the plaintiff failed to allege a relevant market and
remanding for further consideration of additional factors to determine relevant market share).
280. See California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
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suggestions that can make the application of the rule of reason more
effective.
A. Abandon the Quick Look Approach
As discussed above, courts have used the quick look approach
infrequently since it was officially adopted by the Supreme Court in
California Dental.281 Many district courts that have attempted to
apply the quick look approach have done so incorrectly and have
been overturned by the circuit courts.282 In other cases, the courts
have found the defendant’s anticompetitive effects were not so
obvious as to warrant quick look treatment.283 Furthermore, even if a
defendant’s conduct is clearly anticompetitive, if the defendant offers
procompetitive justifications, then the analysis shifts from the quick
look approach to the rule of reason.284 Taking these issues into
account, courts should abandon the quick look approach for several
reasons.285
First, the quick look approach applies only when a defendant’s
anticompetitive conduct is obvious.286 If it is, the court skips the
daunting analysis of the relevant market and the defendant’s market
share and goes straight to considering the defendant’s procompetitive
justifications.287 This may be an efficient step, but once the defendant
offers any legitimate procompetitive justification for its action, the
court must abandon the quick look approach and begin its analysis
anew using the rule of reason.288 This means that the court must
analyze the relevant market and the defendant’s market share. Taking
281. See supra Part III.C.
282. E.g., California ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1183 (9th Cir. 2011).
283. E.g., Harris, 651 F.3d. 1118.
284. See id. at 1134.
285. Professor Alan J. Meese also advocates for abandoning the quick look approach. Meese,
supra note 206, at 464–65. He argues that the courts should use a full-blown rule of reason
analysis to “any restraint that is plausibly procompetitive, even if the restraint appears to affect
price or output.” Id. at 465–66. This is because advances in modern economic theory have shown
that horizontal restraints previously thought to be anticompetitive are in many instances attempts
to minimize costs associated with market contracting and therefore are actually procompetitive.
Id. at 479–80. For example, in Topco, the territorial restraints were formed to reduce transaction
costs in distributing the private label brand. Id. at 480. According to Professor Meese, there is “no
good reason to presume such restraints unlawful without proof of anticompetitive effect.” Id.
Thus, they deserve treatment under the rule of reason.
286. See Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 830–31 (3d Cir. 2010).
287. See id. at 831.
288. Id.
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into account the federal courts’ track record of rarely applying the
quick look approach, the quick look has turned into a tool that stands
in the way of the eventual application of the rule of reason.
Further, the courts already have a working approach to utilize if
the defendant’s conduct is found to have obvious anticompetitive
effects: the per se approach. As the courts have universally held,
conduct that appears plainly anticompetitive is deemed illegal under
the per se approach.289 A defendant’s conduct that is “obvious” under
the quick look approach can surely be “plainly anticompetitive”
under the per se approach. If the court does not want to expand the
per se approach to a defendant’s obvious anticompetitive conduct, a
plaintiff can still prevail under the rule of reason without undertaking
the tedious relevant market analysis by instead proving the
anticompetitive effects of the defendant’s conduct. Because the
conduct in this situation would be so obviously anticompetitive that
the quick look would condemn it, the plaintiff should have no
problem proving the direct effects of the defendant’s anticompetitive
conduct under the rule of reason. Therefore, together the per se
approach and rule of reason sufficiently safeguard the plaintiff where
the defendant’s conduct is plainly anticompetitive.
Doing away with the quick look approach will also simplify
matters for both courts and litigators. For example, in the federal
courts, there will be less back-and-forth between the district court
and circuit court regarding the application of the quick look
approach. Courts can return to focusing on and improving the use of
the per se approach and rule of reason. Similarly, litigators will now
focus only on two possible approaches and will not need to prepare
unnecessarily for a quick look analysis that might not even be used.
B. Apply the Rule of Reason
with Greater Clarity
If the quick look approach is abandoned, the federal courts could
focus on creating a unified approach to the ancillary restraints
doctrine, since there currently appears to be varying interpretations
of the ancillary restraints doctrine.290 Further, the courts do not use a

289. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1979).
290. See supra Part II.B.1.

1218

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1173

universal approach when determining how related a restraint must be
in order to be declared ancillary.291 As Part IV.A described, a
restraint can be “plausibly related,” “reasonably related,” or
“essential” to a joint venture’s procompetitive effects.292 Moreover,
this Article has emphasized that when deciding whether to apply the
rule of reason, a court either looks at the defendant’s procompetitive
justifications or uses the ancillary restraints doctrine. However, there
is no difference between which analysis the court engages in
because, ultimately, the court reaches the same result under both
approaches. To do away with the confusion surrounding the
application of the rule of reason, the courts should first choose either
to analyze the defendant’s procompetitive justifications or to use the
ancillary restraints doctrine. If the courts choose to utilize the
ancillary restraints doctrine in determining whether to apply the rule
of reason, then they should adopt a “reasonably necessary” standard
to analyze how related to the joint venture a restraint must be in
order to be ancillary.293
Using a “plausibly necessary” standard would allow almost all
types of restraints to fall under the rule of reason. This would not be
efficient because, under this standard, hardly any restraint would be
determined to be a naked restraint. As a result, the rule of reason
would apply to conduct that does not deserve such an analysis.
Likewise, using an “essentially necessary” standard would be too
high a threshold because conduct that is reasonably necessary but not
essential would not be analyzed under the rule of reason. Instead, it
would be analyzed, incorrectly, under the per se approach, which
would frustrate the purpose of the ancillary restraints doctrine.
Using a “reasonably necessary” standard would be the most
efficient use of the ancillary restraints doctrine. First, both
reasonably necessary restraints and essential restraints would fall
under the umbrella of the “reasonably necessary” standard. Such a
standard would cover a significant range of restraints while avoiding
291. See supra Part IV.A.
292. Id.
293. Thomas Piraino, Jr., argues that the legality of a joint venture’s restraint should be
determined by its reasonableness. Piraino, supra note 9, at 795. For example, if a restraint is
unrelated to a joint venture’s purpose, it is illegal under Section 1. Id. On the other hand, if a
restraint is “reasonably necessary” to contribute to the purpose of the joint venture, then the
restraint is legal. Id.
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the risk of being too broad or too narrow. Additionally, if a restraint
does not rise to the level of “reasonably necessary,” then the court
should consider whether such a restraint is even ancillary to begin
with. Finally, under the “reasonably necessary” standard, the more
reasonable the restraint is, the more likely that it will be analyzed
under the rule of reason. Therefore, the next time the Supreme Court
has the opportunity to do so, it should clarify the application of the
ancillary restraints doctrine and perhaps encourage the lower federal
courts to apply a “reasonably necessary” standard under that
doctrine. Doing so would restore the federal courts’ analysis to Judge
Taft’s use of the ancillary restraints doctrine in United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.294
C. Keep the Rule of Reason
While the use of a “reasonably necessary” standard under the
ancillary restraints doctrine will lead to a more efficient application
of the doctrine, there remains concern over the application of the rule
of reason. Although the rule of reason has been the dominant method
of analysis in the courts, the academic community has advocated
abandoning it, offering alternative approaches that the courts can
use.295 For example, academics suggest that the courts adopt a
continuum-based approach that focuses on the competitive purpose
of the joint venture.296 Under such an approach, if the joint venture
has a legitimate competitive purpose, then it is deemed legal.297
294. Id. at 794. Under Judge Taft’s analysis of the ancillary restraints doctrine, if the purpose
of horizontal restraint is “to promote the objectives of a separate legitimate transaction, a court
should uphold the restriction as an ‘ancillary’ restraint.” Piraino, supra note 2, at 5–6. But, if the
horizontal restraint was “broader than necessary to achieve the [collaborator]’s legitimate
objectives,” it would be struck down as nonancillary. Id. at 6. Thus, a court would first determine
the legality of, for example, a joint venture, by looking at “the parties’ competitive purposes and
the . . . impact of the joint venture on competition.” Id. If the court upholds the joint venture, then
it should determine whether the restraint is “reasonably necessary to promote the legitimate
purposes of the joint venture.” Id.; see also Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc.,
792 F.2d 210, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“The alternative formulation was that of Judge Taft in
Addyston Pipe & Steel: a naked horizontal restraint, one that does not accompany a contract
integration, can have no purpose other than restricting output and raising prices, and so is illegal
per se; an ancillary horizontal restraint, one that is part of an integration of the economic activities
of the parties and appears capable of enhancing the group's efficiency, is to be judged according
to its purpose and effect.”).
295. E.g., Piraino, supra note 2, at 5.
296. See id. at 28.
297. Id. at 28–29.
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Accordingly, the court would be able to focus on the competitive
characteristics of the joint venture instead of “unnecessary inquiries
into the parties’ market power.”298 Others have recommended ways
to improve the rule of reason.299 Among these improvements the
promulgation of new standards aimed at the legislative goals of the
Sherman Act.300
This Article proposes that once a court determines that the rule
of reason is applicable, it should require plaintiffs to prove
anticompetitive conduct by demonstrating the existence of actual
anticompetitive effects instead of heavily focusing on market-share
analysis. Several commentators have suggested a wide range of
factors to accomplish this goal. For example, one scholar has
suggested that courts may consider “the testimony of market
participants, the internal and third-party market studies, pricing
patterns [among competitors],” and even “views of the plaintiff.”301
Additionally, the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which were
jointly promulgated by the DOJ and FTC, state that in order to
establish a relevant market, one can consider whether a defendant’s
conduct reduced “the number of significant rivals offering a group of
products, [which in turn] cause[d] prices for those products to rise
significantly.”302 These guidelines further note that courts can
consider the “customers’ ability and willingness to substitute away
from one product to another in response to” the change in the
product’s price or a decrease in the quality of the product or
service.303
Courts should also place more emphasis on the purpose behind
the joint venture304 and the degree of integration between the
298. Id. at 5. Also, it has been suggested that courts should focus on the degree of integration
achieved by the parties in a joint venture. Id. at 8, 28–30.
299. Stucke, supra note 197, at 1375.
300. Id. at 1480–81. Under this argument, the Sherman Act was never meant to act “as a
vehicle for the Court to advance its own ideologies.” Id. at 1480. As a result, “[t]he Court should
refrain from announcing new policies based on its perception of ‘modern’ economic theor[ies]”
that are opposite from the Sherman Act’s aims. Id. at 1480–81.
301. James T. McKeown, 2008 Antitrust Developments in Professional Sports: To the Single
Entity and Beyond, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 363, 383 & n.106 (2009).
302. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 7
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf.
303. Id.
304. Piraino, supra note 2, at 5. A “purpose-based approach would avoid both the harshness
of the per se rule and the complexities of a market-based rule of reason . . . analysis.” Id. For
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parties.305 For example, courts should look at the degree of
integration between two or more parties on a continuum.306 If there is
little to no integration, the court should be inclined to hold that the
collaboration violates of Section 1.307 At the other extreme, if the
parties are highly integrated, the court should be inclined to uphold
the collaboration as legal.308 If the collaboration is at neither extreme
but is instead in the middle of the continuum, the court may consider
several factors to make its determination. For example, if a joint
venture combines “assets such as technology, capital, or facilities,” it
is integrated enough to survive per se treatment.309 If such integration
results in cost savings and generates efficiencies, there is a strong
argument that the restraint at issue is reasonable.310 However, this
should not be a blanket rule. Courts should instead review each
restraint on a case-by-case basis because a high degree of integration
between two parties does not always make the conduct of the joint
venture legal.311 A highly integrated joint venture may still produce
anticompetitive effects, while a less integrated joint venture may not.
While incorporating these factors into a court’s analysis may
force that court to shift its emphasis away from the definition of the
relevant market, such change does not come quickly or easily. In
fact, as this Article has demonstrated, courts are still struggling to
better apply the per se approach, the rule of reason, and the quick
look approach in their decisions thirty years after the Court handed
example, if a joint venture has a “legitimate competitive purpose, such as facilitating its partners’
entry into the market,” as opposed to an illegitimate one like “facilitat[ing] collusion in existing
markets,” under the purpose-based approach, a court should uphold the legitimate joint venture
because it is procompetitive. Id.
305. Piraino, supra note 183, at 1163–64.
306. See id.
307. Id. at 1163.
308. Id.
309. Piraino, supra note 2, at 28.
310. Thomas Piraino, Jr., argues that joint ventures should be presumed to be legal. Piraino,
supra note 183, at 1164. Since joint ventures are only partially integrated, this allows both parties
to the joint venture to collaborate and compete with each other at the same time within the same
market. Id. The less integrated a joint venture is, the more it must show that the “venture brings
together business functions of other resources previously held separately by the parties.” See infra
note 311.
311. See Piraino, supra note 183, at 1166. To generate efficiencies, a joint venture must
integrate its resources in “some way.” Id. If a joint venture is collaborating only to make “joint
business decisions” or to “coordinate parallel activities,” then it is not a true joint venture and no
economic benefit results. Id.
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down its major decisions in Broadcast Music, Inc. and NCAA.
Furthermore, there may be unknown issues, such as those regarding
admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence, that may make
incorporating these factors difficult. However, such challenges
should not discourage courts from attempting to integrate these
factors. As this Article argues, the emphasis on—and the difficulty
of—establishing the definition of a defendant’s market share makes
plaintiffs reluctant to bring Section 1 claims against collaborators
and makes such cases difficult for them to win. This should not be
the case, especially when the challenged restraint threatens consumer
welfare.
VI. CONCLUSION
To shed light on one of the “darkest corners of antitrust law,”312
the Supreme Court must issue a clear and consistent holding that the
lower federal courts can use to better apply the per se approach and
rule of reason to horizontal restraints. Unfortunately, progress takes
time. In attempting to achieve this change, the federal courts must
strive for simplicity.
This Article has argued that the quick look approach should be
abandoned because the per se approach and the rule of reason
provide adequate safeguards that will hold competitors accountable
when collaborating with each other. Such a result will free the
courts’ time and resources and create greater consistency that
American firms can rely on. This Article has also urged the Supreme
Court to clarify its application of the ancillary restraints doctrine in
Texaco by using a “reasonably related” standard to decide how
related an ancillary restraint must be to a joint venture’s principal
transaction. Finally, this Article has suggested that, when applying
the rule of reason, courts should move away from emphasizing only
the defendant’s share of the relevant market and instead focus also
on other factors, including the degree of integration among the
collaborators, internal or third party studies, and testimony of market
participants.
The federal courts have made progress in better administering
the per se approach and the rule of reason. While considerable
312. Brodley, supra note 2, at 453.
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confusion still exists, the small, but forward, progress that several
circuit courts have made is promising. As long as the federal courts
keep in mind the concept of simplicity and the interest of the
consumer, the time will come when the regulation of the law of
horizontal restraints will move out of the shadows and into the light.
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